Abstract -Large Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) swarms are a nascent technology promising useful military and civilian solutions to logistical problems. Securing data communications within the swarm is essential to accomplishing swarm objectives. The Naval Postgraduate School has successfully demonstrated the launch, flight and landing of 50 UAVs. The communications architecture to support a UAV swarm is unique. This paper details the practical challenges of creating a secure communications channel in the swarm.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of ever cheaper hardware and further development of unmanned systems technology, the ability to field large swarms of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has become a reality. On August 27, 2015 the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) set a world record by autonomously launching, flying and landing 50 UAVs concurrently [1] . The UAV swarm can be controlled by a single operator, guiding it to perform a specific behavior. Specific behaviors include area search, point intercept, ordered transit and mass ordered landing.
A. Research Motivations and Contributions
Currently there is no security architecture built into the UAV swarm at NPS. This stems from various factors, including cost and how UAV performance will be affected by computationally expensive encryption operations. However, the inability to solve the security problem has and will continue to have severe consequences for swarm deployment [2] [3] . In the last several years, researchers have studied the various cyber security threats that UAV swarms face. These threats have been identified, along with extensive risk assessments [4] [5] . While there is a consensus in the research propriate algorithms to facilitate a security architecture for UAV swarm communications. As large UAV swarms are just coming into existence, examples of security implementations in practice do not exist. This is especially true for large swarms. A swarm that is unable to operate securely is almost entirely useless in any military or civilian application.
In this paper, we focus on the impact of communication security on the swarm. This includes both encryption and authentication. Authenticated encryption (AE) is designed to simultaneously protect both a message's privacy and authenticity. For classified information communications, we study the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). AES has been approved and adopted by the National Security Agency (NSA) as the official cryptographic module for the transmission of SECRET and TOP SECRET information. We implement four modes of AES: Counter with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CCM), Galois/Counter Mode (GCM), Synthetic Initialization Vector (SIV) and EAX. In addition, we also implemented ChaCha20-Poly1305, an unstandardized AE algorithm. This is used as a baseline for securing unclassified swarm communications. We present results that show the impact of these algorithms on network throughput and execution time.
It must be noted that this is a work in progress. The results we present in this paper reflect limited scale experiments run on the UAV software. We are in the process of building a full network simulation scenario using Network Simulator 3 (NS3) in which we will run experiments using a number of UAVs. These simulations will be concluded in the coming months.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we present how the swarm is designed and operates, with specific detail on the communications architecture. Section III contains a discussion on communication security, and how it is to be implemented in the swarm. Various AE techniques will be presented for consideration. Section IV presents network traffic analysis, including the impact of AE on network throughput. In Section V we perform a comparison of AE techniques on the ODroid processor.
The percentage of time spent on cryptographic operations for each AE technique is calculated. In Section VI we conclude with a description of ongoing work.
II. SWARM SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

A. Concept of Operations
The swarm architecture and its detailed operation can be found in [1] and are summarized here. UAVs launch at regular intervals of about 15 seconds and transit to a waiting area where they await a command from the swarm controller. The swarm controller has a set of predefined behaviors to choose from. After performing the set of defined behaviors, a command is sent to land. The swarm will then sort itself and land in an orderly fashion.
Each UAV was built from low-cost commercially available components. Fig 1. shows a picture of the NPS UAV. The swarm communicates with an ALFA AWUS036NEH Long Range Wi-Fi Radio and processes information on an ODroid U3 computer with Ubuntu Linux 14.04. The ODroid computer has a Samsung Exynos4412 Prime Cortex-A9 Quad Core 1.7 GHz with 1 MB L2 cache. All software is coded in Python. Each UAV also possesses a remote control (RC) link and a 900MHz serial link, but are used for emergency and not necessary for swarm operation. In a secure setting they would be turned off.
B. Communications Architecture
The swarm communicates using 802.11n in ad hoc mode. The Wi-Fi radio has a single spatial stream operating on a 20 MHz channel, allowing for a maximum data rate of 72.2 Mbps. Each message is broadcast to each of the other UAVs. There is no expectation of privacy from any of the other UAVs. It is single hop, so there is no routing. All messages use UDP on top of IPv4, which by definition is connectionless. There is a small subset of messages that do receive acknowledgements, but that is built on top of UDP with a custom protocol. Fig. 2 shows the information pathways to and from a UAV. Increasing the reliability by using TCP, implementing a routing protocol, and communicating with direct links instead of broadcast would significantly increase latency and congestion on the network to the point that it becomes intolerable with a large swarm.
A side effect of the chosen architecture is the need to be tolerant of lossy communications. Messages must adhere to two principles. They must be stateless and idempotent. Stateless means a message cannot rely on a different message having been received. Idempotent means any message received may only change the state of the UAV once and only once. Duplicate messages do not further change the UAV state [6] . Table I lists the components that make up a message with typical lengths. Any security implementation should not fundamentally alter or impose changes on the defined communication structure. Doing so would limit the range of behaviors available and increase the complexity.
III. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
A. Communication Threats
Due to the fact that swarm communications are broadcast in every direction, any receiver within range of the UAV is able to collect communications. In order to prevent tactical information from being discovered, encryption is a necessary requirement. Due to the ease of message capture, and open nature of communications, the swarm is particularly vulnerable to replay attacks. As such, strong authentication is also an absolute necessity.
B. Cryptographic Methods
There are two broad categories for providing encryption and authentication in the swarm: symmetrically and asymmetrically. With asymmetric encryption, a public key is used to encrypt and a private key is used to decrypt. This would create a different communication channel between each UAV. In addition, to provide authentication, the system would require a secure central repository for public keys. That repository would either be a UAV or a ground station.
Asymmetric cryptography is not an option for swarm communications. It is a potential option for initially keying or for inflight rekeying, but for regular communications it would permanently impose an undesirable structure on the swarm.
Symmetric encryption is faster and works within the current swarm architecture. In this construct the same key would be preloaded before flight into each UAV. The UAV would encrypt and decrypt with this same key.
C. Authenticated Encryption Alternatives
There are only two options authorized for the encryption of classified data, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) [7] . It is well established that AES is faster, more secure and efficient [8] and should be the chosen method for classified operations. Within AES, there are two AE modes available, GCM and Counter with CCM. GCM has been a part of the NSA Suite B since 2007 [7] . It has the benefit of being both efficient and parallelizable [9] . While both CCM and GCM provide secure solutions, GCM has a reputation for being faster [10] .
SIV and EAX are highly specialized AE techniques designed for specific problems. Initialization Vectors (IVs) are used by cryptographic algorithms to ensure duplicate messages produce unique ciphertexts. For most algorithms, including CCM and GCM, improper selection of the IV has catastrophic results. SIV was designed to be tolerant of IV misuse, but by sacrificing speed [11] .
EAX is another AES mode that was built to improve upon certain features of CCM. It can use arbitrary length IVs, and it does not need to know the message length in advance before beginning the algorithm. It also is a two pass mode (i.e., one pass to achieve privacy and the other pass for authenticity), and as such was not designed for speed [12] . SIV and EAX are currently under consideration for use in a classified environment and were included in the ODroid processor performance analysis [13] .
The ChaCha20 algorithm for encryption and Poly1305 for authentication have become a popular alternative in industry for performing AE [14] . In 2014, Google replaced GCM on its Android phones with ChaCha20-Poly1305, believing it to be more secure and showing it to be significantly faster in software implementations [15] . ChaCha20-Poly1305 was designed to be fast in software on generic computer architectures by minimizing hardware intensive operations such as matrix multiplication [16] . While not approved for classified data, it was included in the analysis to provide both a baseline and an option for secure communications when the swarm is not performing classified operations.
The AES algorithms were implemented using the Python library PyCryptodomex 3.4.2. This library is written in Python where possible, except for the pieces critical to performance, which were written in C [17] . ChaCha20-Poly1305 was implemented using the Python library PyNaCl 1.0.1. The library is also written in Python but is a wrapper around the libsodium library, which is written in C.
PyCryptodomex allows for IV sizes of between 7 and 13 bytes for CCM. For CCM, the chosen IV size was 13 bytes and for all other AES based algorithms it was 16 bytes as recommended by [18] . The IV size for PyNaCl is required to be 24 bytes [19] .
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) are bytes attached to each message used to verify the authenticity of a message. The MAC size for each algorithm was 16 bytes [18] [19] .
D. Appropriate Layer for Applying Security
In most applications there is a choice of whether to place security at the application layer or at the transport layer. Due to the connectionless nature of the swarm, it is possible to place security at an even lower level, just above the Physical Layer. Every message that is sent on the swarm channel is received by every other entity, with no expectation of routing. Therefore, the entire frame can be encrypted, including MAC addresses. This would prevent an adversary from gathering potentially critical message source information. Doing so, however, would require specialized hardware and/or software and is not possible with the current swarm configuration.
Security at the Transport Layer is also problematic. WPA2 with authentication on Ubuntu 14.04 is not supported for a connectionless ad hoc network without a central access point or centralized authentication server [20] . The ALFA Wi-Fi radio provides WPA2 encryption but only with 128 bit keys and lacks authentication that would work with the connectionless swarm configuration [21] .
Security at the Application Layer is easily implementable, and provides privacy and authenticity. For the purposes of this study, security was implemented at the Application Layer on the ODroid processor. Implementation at the Application Layer will allow us to determine the impact of security on communications within the swarm.
IV. EFFECTS OF AUTHENTICATED ENCRYPTION ON THE NETWORK THROUGHPUT
A. Simulation Description
To determine the effects of security on the network it is necessary to get a sense of the amount and type of traffic that is being passed.
Three instances of UAVs were created using multi-UAV simulation in the loop (SITL) software, commanded and flown with actual flight software as described in [22] . The messages passed between UAVs and ground station were the same as though the UAVs had been flying. For each message on the channel, the message type, size, time of transmission and sending UAV was recorded. A larger software swarm would have been preferred, but hardware limitations resulted in inaccurate results when the number of UAVs grew larger than three. Section IV-C discusses how the results obtained from a three UAV swarm are relevant to larger swarms.
The swarm has the following behaviors that it can perform:
• Line Formation: UAVs form into a line and fly to a designated location or flight pattern.
• Swarm Search: UAVs cooperatively search a specified area.
• Greedy Shooter: UAVs find the closest enemy UAV and tag it as being shot.
• PN Interceptor: Command given to one UAV to intercept another.
• Eager Altitude Sort: UAVs are sorted by altitude.
Missing information is requested from other UAVs.
Responses to requests are given about itself and other missing UAVs.
• Lazy Altitude Sort: Similar to Eager Altitude Sort except only missing information about itself is broadcast.
• Independent Transit: All UAVs in a subswarm transit separately to a geographic position.
• Sequence Land: UAVs land in an orderly fashion. A software application called Swarm Commander is used to command the swarm to perform these behaviors during actual operations. In the simulation, Swarm Commander was used to execute each of the behaviors in the order presented above. When parameters were required, the default values were selected.
B. Simulation Results
There was an average of 13.02 messages per UAV transmitted in any given second. The average number of messages per second for a three UAV swarm was 39.07, with a standard deviation of 6.618 and a high of 52. The average unencrypted message size was 141.61 bytes with a standard deviation of 12.54. Fig. 3 illustrates the throughput of the 3 UAV swarm over the time of the experiment. As can be seen, throughput is fairly constant, and it is difficult to distinguish when certain behaviors are occurring. Table II shows the breakdown of occurrence by message type. Traffic is dominated by just three types of messages: Pose, Flight Status and Heartbeat. These messages are used by the UAVs to update each other and the ground station with telemetry and health information. They are sent out at regular intervals regardless of swarm size. Fig. 4 shows the same throughput as Fig. 3 , but with Pose, Flight Status and Heartbeat messages removed. Throughput is much less, and areas where behaviors occur are somewhat distinguishable. Table III shows the effects of AE on swarm throughput. ChaCha20-Poly1305 had the greatest overhead. Note that the bytes per message overhead incurred by each algorithm is constant, regardless of message length. Thus as message length increases, the overhead as a percentage of message length due to cryptographic operations decreases. 
C. Extending Results to Larger Swarms
Knowing how these results apply to larger swarm sizes is essential for an accurate understanding of the effects of AE on network throughput. To determine the effects, it is necessary to analyze each message and determine how it depends on the size of the swarm. There are two ways in which a message can be dependent on swarm size: length dependent and frequency dependent. A message is length dependent if a particular message changes length as a function of swarm size. A message is frequency dependent if how often a message is sent depends on swarm size.
With complete message independence of swarm size, growth rate of network traffic is ( ) O n where n is the number of UAVs in the swarm. In a behavior where messages grow by a constant amount with each additional UAV, growth rate of network traffic would be
. In a behavior where the frequency of messages increases at a constant rate with each additional UAV, the growth rate of network traffic would also shows how average throughput will increase as the swarm size grows. In this scenario, even in a 100 UAV swarm, and 30% cryptographic overhead, the swarm does not approach the 72.2 Mbps throughput ceiling. If an additional packet is sent by each additional UAV per second, and each of those messages grows by 10 bytes for each UAV, we get the results seen in Fig. 6 . With larger swarms the channel becomes overwhelmed, even without cryptographic overhead. Fig. 6 give a reasonable lower and upper bound on network traffic. To determine the likelihood of the two scenarios, a closer examination of each behavior was undertaken. Table IV shows how each behavior affects message dependence on swarm size. Flight Status, Pose and Heartbeat messages are sent out at frequencies of 10Hz, 2Hz and 2Hz respectively, regardless of swarm size.
The Eager Altitude Sort and Line Formation behaviors make use of a consensus sort algorithm. This algorithm requests a message from each UAV from which it lacks information. A larger swarm increases the likelihood of missing information. In addition, response messages from any UAV includes information from any other UAV whose information was also requested, thus message lengths will also increase. Designers recognized this and limited the frequency of the messages to 4Hz. Thus, the frequency dependence has an upper bound.
In the Greedy Shooter behavior, the frequency dependence is very weak and probably undetectable. As the swarms grow, the density of UAVs also grows creating more shooting opportunities, and thus more kill reports.
In the Lazy Altitude Sort behavior, the consensus sort algorithm is also used with the difference being any UAV whose information is requested will only respond with information about itself. Thus there is no length dependence. The frequency dependence is again limited to 4Hz.
In the Swarm Search behavior, a lead UAV is designated at the commencement of the behavior. The lead UAV proceeds to assign search areas to each of the other UAVs in its subswarm. There is frequency dependence, but only from the point of view of the lead UAV.
The worst case for network traffic would be during a behavior using the consensus sort algorithm where each UAV requested information from every other UAV. If an additional 4 messages were sent from each UAV per second, each UAV grew 10 bytes for each UAV in the swarm, and a 30% overhead was added on for worst case cryptography, the resulting throughput would look similar to that shown in Fig.  7 . Even with the worst case behavior, and using the largest cryptographic overhead, the swarm communications channel is left with some operational margin.
IV. EFFECTS OF AUTHENTICATED ENCRYPTION ON THE ODROID COMPUTER
A. Experiment Description
To completely understand the impact of AE on the swarm, it is necessary to determine if the ODroid processor is capable of sustaining the cryptographic overhead incurred. To make this determination, GCM, CCM, SIV, EAX and ChaCha20-Poly1305 algorithms were implemented and executed on the ODroid hardware.
AE was performed on messages of sizes ranging from 8 to 32,768 bytes and then decrypted and authenticated. For each message size, this step was repeated 10,000 times and averaged. Each message was randomized on each pass to create as cold a cache as possible.
The experiment was repeated with key sizes of 128, 192 and 256 bits. ChaCha20-Poly1305 and SIV do not provide functionality for key sizes of 128 and 192 bits.
B. Experiment Results
Figs 8, 9 and 10 show the results for key sizes of 128, 192, and 256 bits, respectively. As was expected, the best performance for any key size was ChaCha20-Poly1305. EAX and SIV had the poorest overall results. This poor performance was expected given their specialized nature.
According to the results, CCM outperformed GCM. As stated earlier, the biggest advantage of GCM is its ability to be parallelizable. GCM did not perform better than CCM in this situation for the following reason: GCM performs best when software is tailored to the hardware, making use of parallel processors [9] [23] .
It does not appear that the PyCryptodomex library makes full use of the parallelizable nature of GCM, and it certainly was not designed specifically for the ODroid computer. These results are consistent with the results found in [12] .
Another interesting result is how little key size affects speed of execution, especially with smaller messages. The average length of an unencrypted message was 141.61 bytes. 
C. ODroid Performance under Various Network Loads
From the channel throughput analysis in Section IV, we can predict the burden that cryptography will place on the ODroid computer. Given that the average unencrypted message size was 141.61 bytes, and the average number of messages per second per UAV was 13.02, an average cryptographic load for a given swarm size on the ODroid computer can be estimated.
Assuming messages do not exhibit any dependence on swarm size (as laid out in Fig. 5 ) and assuming an average case throughput of 13.02 messages per UAV per second, the percentage of time out of each second spent conducting cryptographic operations is displayed in Fig. 11 . SIV and EAX would not be able to support a 50 UAV swarm, as the ODroid would be spending 100% of its time on cryptographic operations and still not be able to keep up with the traffic load. GCM and CCM might be able to manage an average case load in a 50 UAV swarm, but it would be consuming a significant amount of the processing capacity, leaving little to other processes. Fig. 11 shows the worst case scenario as defined by Fig 6. Using a smaller key size does not improve performance by any meaningful amount. Clearly SIV, EAX, GCM and CCM are not an option. It does appear that ChCha20-Poly1305 would be successful in providing AE for the swarm.
D. Mitigations for Classified Information
Currently the swarm at NPS is used for academic purposes. It does not gather or create classified information and thus does not require the use of an AES based algorithm. In the event that classified information was gathered, the following mitigations could be used to enable the use of either GCM or CCM:
• Upgrade to a more powerful processor.
• Use an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC).
• Tailor the AES algorithm to the ODroid processor.
• Only use AE on command data. Performing AE only on command data would give access to information about the state of the swarm and its current location, and might not be tolerable. It also opens the risk of an adversary planting false telemetry data and surreptitiously changing the state of the swarm. It would, however, prevent the taking over of the swarm by the sending of direct commands. Fig.13 shows the impact on swarm performance in the worst case network channel scenario presented in Fig. 7 when only command data is encrypted. With this mitigation, SIV and EAX still fall short of acceptability on large swarms. GCM and CCM perform tolerably, and ChaCha20-Poly1305 again proves the superior method.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND ONGOING WORK
In the current swarm configuration and architecture, analysis indicates that performing AE with GCM, CCM, SIV or EAX is not feasible. GCM and CCM are only feasible by accepting risk. The best choice by far is ChaCha20-Poly1305, and it should be the AE choice in any scenario where classified data is not being handled or created.
Future work is needed to fully and accurately determine the true effect of AE on swarm communications. The following course of action is either planned or in progress:
• An NS3 model of the channel is being built. This will allow a more in depth understanding of how much capacity is actually available. It will be able to model how distance, packet collision avoidance and modulation affect throughput.
• An experiment has been designed to bombard an ODroid with typical traffic through an 802.11n connection. The amount of traffic will be increased until a saturation point is discovered. This will help determine how much processor margin is available for cryptographic operations.
• Power consumption due to AE could prove significant. An experiment is planned to measure the impact AE has on battery life. Operating a swarm without communication security poses too great a risk in almost any operation. Completion of this work is essential for the ultimate success of UAV swarms in any operational environment.
